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1. INTRODUCTION
Countries from central and eastern Europe (CEE)
have been hit the hardest by the crisis, compared
to other regions of the world. Figure 1 shows that
in October 2009, the weighted average 2010 GDP
level of 30 CEE countries was forecast to be 15.8
percent lower than was expected in October
20071. There has been less downward revision in
other emerging and developing country groups,
ranging from 5.9 percent (average of 13 countries
in the Middle East) to 7.5 percent (average of 25
Asian countries, excluding China and transition
economies in Central Asia). The main epicentre of
the crisis, the US, has suffered a 7.4 percent down-
ward revision, while downward revision was 8.8
percent for the EU15. Figure 1 also indicates that
there is great heterogeneity among CEE countries,
and only a few of them have fared better than the
EU15 average.
1. In our view, comparison
to a benchmark, ie the
downward revision of
the forecast level of GDP
at a future date, is a
better measure of the
severity of the crisis
than the actual fall in
GDP. However, the actual
fall of GDP was also
greatest in the CEE
group of countries, com-
pared to other regions of
the world.
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Figure 1: Downward revision of GDP level forecasts for 2010, October 2009 forecast compared to
October 2007 forecast, percentage difference
Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF and DG ECFIN forecasts published in October 2007 and October 2009.
Note. Values shown correspond to percentage difference between the 2010 GDP level forecasts made in October 2009 and in
October 2007. Country group values are weighted averages (using GDP weights): CEE30: 30 countries from central and east-
ern Europe; EU15: the 15 members of the EU before 2004; ASIA25: 25 countries from Asia excluding China and transition
economies in Central Asia; LATAM32: 32 countries from Latin America; MIDDLE EAST13: 13 countries from the Middle East;
AFRICA48: 48 countries from Africa.Zsolt Darvas EU SUPPORT TO CEE COUNTRIES DURING THE CRISIS
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Before the crisis, CEE countries seemed to be
catching-up quickly and smoothly. The success-
ful transition and pre-crisis catch-up process
stood on four pillars:
1 Political and institutional integration into the
EU, with ten CEE countries becoming EU mem-
bers between 2004 and 2007, and higher
hopes for many others for future membership; 
2 Financial integration into the EU, which has led
to, for example, significant foreign direct invest-
ment and lending to CEE countries, and also to
the dominant position of western European
banking groups in the banking system of most
countries in the region;
3 Trade integration into the EU, as the EU became
the dominant trading partner for most CEE
countries;
4 Migration flows into the EU, as some countries
in the region have experienced very large out-
flows of workers to western European
countries, helping them to acquire new skills
and achieve better living standards.
EU integration was not just beneficial to CEE
countries but also to western Europe, as demon-
strated by, for example, the assessment of the
2004/07 enlargement round by the European
Commission (2009). EU integration, on the other
hand, also contributed to the build-up of various
vulnerabilities, such as huge credit, housing and
consumption booms, and consequently high cur-
rent-account deficits and external debt in many
countries of the region. Pre-crisis complacency
about the vulnerable structures was fuelled by the
belief that decoupling saving and investment deci-
sions was mostly the reflection of better utilisa-
tion of resources, with EU integration serving as a
shelter against shocks. 
The crisis that so severely hit CEE countries has
led the EU and international financial institutions
to take various actions to support the region. Euro-
pean institutions have several facilities that can
be used to support crisis-hit countries. The crisis
itself led to upgrades of some of the facilities and
the introduction of some new ones. Furthermore,
the procedures of some general facilities not
related to the crisis were modified, enabling their
use to help crisis-hit countries. 
The purpose of this policy contribution is to take
stock of the main instruments and channels by
which the EU and western European economies
have supported crisis-hit CEE countries. The aim
is not to summarise all financial and other instru-
ments directed towards new EU member states
and other countries in the eastern neighbourhood,
but only to list actions implemented in response
to the crisis. To this end, we first summarise fac-
tors that mitigated the effect of the crisis, then dis-
cuss some amplifying factors, and close this
contribution with some thoughts on assessment.
2. MITIGATING FACTORS
The EU medium-term financial assistance facility
for non-euro-area EU countries. Since 1969 the
EU has had a facility for granting loans to EU
member states facing difficulties with their bal-
ance of payments2. The facility was redesigned in
2002 and the lending ceiling was set at €12 bil-
lion. In response to the crisis, the ceiling was
raised to €25 billion on 25 November 2008 and to
€50 billion on 5 May 2009. As part of a coordi-
nated international lending programme, Hungary,
Latvia and Romania have received loans from this
facility, conditional on the implementation of com-
prehensive economic programmes aimed at
ensuring fiscal consolidation, structural reform
and support for the financial system. Table 1
details the sums provided by the lenders. The
loans are disbursed in separate instalments
according to the agreed schedule and progress of
the implementation of the conditions. Lenders
aims to coordinate but do not necessarily dis-
burse the tranches at the same time3. The EU’s
contribution to these programmes is fully
2. For example, the last use
of this facility for an EU15
country was a loan of ECU 8
billion to Italy approved by
the Council on 18 January
1993. The loan was made
available in four tranches of
ECU 2 billion for an average
period of six years.
3. For example, regarding
the decision about the
release of the second
installment of the loan to
Latvia, there was
approximately a one month
discrepancy between the
decisions of the EU and the
IMF in the summer of 2009
and this period was
characterised by
heightened uncertainty
about what would happen in
case the IMF declined to
continue funding Latvia.
‘EU integration benefited both CEE countries and western Europe, but contributed to huge credit,
housing and consumption booms, high current-account deficits and external debt.’EU SUPPORT TO CEE COUNTRIES DURING THE CRISISZsolt Darvas
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financed by bond issuance by the European
Union. The EU loans under this facility (ie not con-
sidering individual EU member countries and Euro-
pean institutions) amounted from about 39
percent (Romania) to 182 percent (Latvia) of
approved IMF loans.
Frontloading of structural and cohesion funds for
EU member states. Although the allocation of
structural and cohesion funds with the goals of
supporting the EU's poorer regions and supporting
infrastructure improvements within them is not
related to the crisis, frontloading of disbursement
was decided on in response to the crisis. Front-
loading amounts to €11 billion of which €7 billion
is for the new EU member states (see Barroso,
2009).
Expansion of the European Investment Bank's
activities.The EIB, created by the Treaty of Rome
in 1958 as the EU's long-term lending bank, raises
funds on the capital markets with the aim of
financing projects that further the EU's policy
objectives. In response to the crisis, a decision
was taken to significantly expand the Bank's
activities, with an extra €15 billion per annum
available in 2009 and 2010 – a 30 percent
increase above average lending. Lending has
advanced particularly strongly in three key areas:
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);
energy and climate change mitigation; and invest-
ment in the poorer, ‘convergence’ regions of the EU.
Convergence lending will increase by €2.5 billion
per annum, with particular emphasis on the new
EU member states. Most of the activities of the EIB
are concentrated in EU countries, but the EIB also
finances projects in the EU's neighbourhood.
Expansion of the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development's activities. The EBRD,
which is not an EU institution but is owned by 61
countries, the European Community and the EIB,
has also responded forcefully to the crisis. The
EBRD facilitates project lending in 30 countries
from central Europe to central Asia by borrowing
funds on the capital markets. The EBRD has
increased planned investments during 2009 to €7
billion from €5.1 billion in 2008, and concentrates
on recapitalising sound banks, expanding the
trade facilitation programme, financing energy
and infrastructure projects, and setting up a cor-
porate support facility. 
The EBRD, EIB Group and World Bank Group joint
action plan for bank lending. On 27 February
2009 the EBRD, EIB Group and World Bank Group
announced a joint action plan to support with up
to €24.5 billion in two years, CEE banking sectors
and bank lending to businesses, in particular to
small and medium-sized companies. Although
Recipient of the loan
Provider of the loan
Hungary, Oct-Nov
2008
Latvia, Dec 2008
- Jan 2009
Romania, April-
May 2009
Total for these
three countries
EU 6.5 3.1 5.0 14.6
IMF 12.5 1.7 13.0 27.2
World Bank 1.0 0.4 1.0 2.4
Sweden, Denmark, Finland,
Estonia and Norway
1.9 1.9
EBRD, Czech Rep and Poland 0.4 0.4
EBRD and EIB 1.0 1.0
Total 20.0 7.5 20.0 47.5
Total (% of 2008 GDP) 19% 32% 15% 18%
EU loans (% of IMF loans) 52.0% 182.4% 38.6% 53.8%
Table 1: Multilateral financial assistance including EU’s balance of payment support for EU member
states (€ billion unless otherwise noted)
Source: European Commission.Zsolt Darvas EU SUPPORT TO CEE COUNTRIES DURING THE CRISIS
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this initiative is part of the EIB and EBRD activities
discussed above, it has a crucial role and it is
hence important to emphasise it separately, not
least because of its coordinated nature and the
participation of the World Bank. The financial sup-
port will include equity and debt finance, credit
lines and political risk insurance.
Foreign ownership of CEE banks. A large propor-
tion of the banks in CEE countries is owned by
western European banks. Without western owner-
ship, banks in the region would probably have
been denied euro liquidity altogether. The com-
mitment not to let any systemically-important
bank fail in the euro area and also in Sweden
(whose banks own most of the banking system in
the Baltic countries), the EU political commitment
that packages helping international banking
groups can benefit subsidiaries, and the ECB’s liq-
uidity support to euro-area banking groups, also
helped their subsidiaries in the CEE region4.
The 'Vienna Initiative'.This is a multilateral effort
to secure financial sector stability in those CEE
countries with substantial foreign bank owner-
ship. It stipulates coordination between all rele-
vant stake holders, including international
banking groups, home- and host-country authori-
ties, international financial institutions and the
EU, with the aim of developing a common under-
standing. It aims to secure the commitments by
both international banking groups and home and
host-country authorities, and to coordinate a fair
burden sharing (see Box 1.4 in EBRD 2009).
Agreements between European central banks.
Table 2 summarises the main liquidity provision
agreements between European central banks.
Three CEE countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithua-
nia) are participating in the EU exchange rate
‘A large proportion of the banks in CEE countries is owned by western European banks. 
Without this western ownership, banks in the region would probably have been denied
euro liquidity altogether.’
4. Statistical analysis
presented in EBRD (2009)
suggests that foreign bank
presence attenuated the
capital outflow after the
collapse of the Lehman
Brothers in September
2008.
ECB Denmark Sweden Norway Switzerland
Denmark
Swap (27/10/08)
ERM-II facility
(1/1/99)
Sweden
Swap
Date not announced
Switzerland Swap (1/10/08)
Hungary Euro repo (10/10/08) Euro/CHF swap
(28/1/09)
Poland Euro repo (6/11/08)
Euro/CHF swap
(17/11/08)
Estonia
ERM-II facility
(28/6/04)
SEK/EEK swap
(27/2/09)
Latvia
ERM-II facility
(2/5/05)
Euro/lats swap
(16/12/08)
Euro/lats swap
(16/12/08)
Lithuanuia
ERM-II facility
(28/6/04)
Iceland
Euro/ISK swap
(16/5/08)
Euro/ISK swap
(16/5/08)
Euro/ISK swap
(16/5/08)
Table 2: Liquidity provision agreements between European central banks (date of introduction in
brackets)
Source: Central bank websites. Note. The swap agreement between the ECB and the Sveriges Riksbank was announced ret-
rospectively in the Annual Report of the Riksbank without indicating the date of introduction. Major European central banks
(ECB and the central banks of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) have swap agreements with
the Federal Reserve.EU SUPPORT TO CEE COUNTRIES DURING THE CRISISZsolt Darvas
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mechanism (ERM-II). Since these countries uni-
laterally maintain no or very narrow exchange rate
bands, the short-term financing facility available
for ERM-II participants to support the stability of
the exchange rate has not yet been used, because
this facility is to be used primarily at the bound-
aries of the official +/-15 percent wide band5. 
The central banks of Denmark and Sweden offered
Latvia currency swaps between euro and Latvian
lats (ie temporary exchange of the two curren-
cies). Sweden also offered to Estonia a Swedish
krona/Estonian kroon swap. The option of getting
foreign exchange liquidity in exchange for domes-
tic currency alleviates the pressure on domestic
currency markets.
The European Central Bank offered euro repur-
chase agreements (repo) to Hungary and Poland.
Under these agreements the two CEE central
banks can receive temporary euro liquidity in
exchange for securities eligible for ECB transac-
tions, such as euro-denominated government
bonds issued in the euro area. This repo does not
involve a change in currency denomination. Still, it
was useful, because the Hungarian and Polish
central banks could support their domestic banks
with euro liquidity without giving the impression
of falling foreign exchange reserves, as a repo
does not affect the headline number for foreign
exchange reserves6.
The Swiss National Bank offered euro/Swiss franc
swaps to Hungary and Poland thereby helping
these countries to get Swiss franc liquidity in
exchange for euros. Since Swiss franc lending
became widespread in these countries, but money
market conditions in western Europe made it
rather difficult to get Swiss franc liquidity, this
facility was also helpful.
Boosting IMF resources by €125 billion. In
response to the April 2009 G20 meeting, Euro-
pean governments have committed to provide
€125 billion to the IMF, which is 35 percent of the
increase in the IMF's lending capacity from $250
billion to $750 billion. Since the CEE region is the
largest recipient of IMF loans, part of this contri-
bution will arrive in the region (see eg the Euro-
pean Commission’s press release IP/09/1656). 
Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) to third
countries. This is a policy-based financial instru-
ment of untied and undesignated balance-of-
payments support to partner third countries. It
takes the form of medium/long-term loans or
grants, or a combination of these, and in many
cases it has complemented financial support from
other international financial institutions. MFA
loans are financed through EU borrowings on the
market. MFA grants are financed under the EU’s
budget. The annual disbursement under this facil-
ity declined to a range of €20-€67 million between
2004 and 2007. At the time of writing, no com-
prehensive information is available on the use of
this facility7and hence Table 3 showing the result
of our data collection based on various Commis-
sion press releases may not be complete.
All MFA loans indicated in Table 3 were proposed
by the Commission in October 2009, ie well after
the conclusion of the talks for the IMF Stand-by
Agreements, though certain other supports to
some of these countries were implemented earlier
(see below). The MFA loans proposed amounted
from about four percent (Ukraine) to 11 percent
(Armenia) of previously-approved IMF loans.
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA).To
express the EU's solidarity during the global eco-
nomic crisis with the pre-accession countries, in
February 2009 the Commission proposed to
extend its Economic Recovery Plan for the West-
ern Balkans. To this end, at least €120 million IPA
funds was planned to be allocated to support the
economic and social consolidation of the region
5. Slovakia was also an ERM
II member before joining
the euro area, and it
relied on the full flexibil-
ity of the +/- 15% wide
band. After strong appre-
ciation pressures, the
central parity of the
Slovak koruna was reval-
ued twice (see Figure 13
in Darvas, 2009b). The
second revaluation,
which set the new central
rate to the previous lower
limit of the ERM II band
(SKK/EUR 30.126), took
place with effect from 29
May 2008. The ECOFIN
Council decided on the
same final conversion
rate on 8 July 2008.
Between late May 2008
and the end of 2008 the
Slovak koruna remained
very close to this conver-
sion value, although
some depreciation was
observed in October
2008 to about a rate of
30.8. However, no central
bank interventions were
conducted in the foreign
exchange market
because Slovakia's credi-
ble euro-area entry
prospect induced a suffi-
cient motive for banks to
enter arbitrage deals
(see Section 3.2 in
Národná Banka Sloven-
ska, 2009).
6. The Danish and the
Swedish central banks
(which had swap agree-
ments with both the ECB
and the central bank of
Latvia) had, at least in
principle, the possibility
of channeling euros from
the ECB to Latvia in
exchange for lats.
7. As of 23 December 2009,
the latest information
available at the Commis-
sion’s website dedicated
to this facility refers to
the year 2007:
http://ec.europa.eu/econ
omy_finance/financial_op
erations/market/third_co
untries/index_en.htm
‘The European Central Bank offered euro repurchase agreements to Hungary and Poland. This
was useful, because the Hungarian and Polish central banks could support their domestic banks
with euro liquidity without giving the impression of falling foreign exchange reserves.’Zsolt Darvas EU SUPPORT TO CEE COUNTRIES DURING THE CRISIS
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(Commission press release IP/09/204). On 31
July 2009, the EU approved a €100 million grant
to Serbia from the IPA budget (Commission press
release IP/09/1213) and, on 11 August 2009, a
€39 million grant to Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Commission press release IP/09/1230).
Crisis Response Package for the south eastern
Europe. Commission grants amounting to €150
million have been allocated to support economic
stability and development in south-eastern
Europe. On 31 July 2009 the EU approved an €85
million financial crisis package for the western
Balkans and Turkey from this facility. This grant is
augmented with loans from the EIB and EBRD
(Commission press release IP/09/1213).
Supporting western European economies. Since
most CEE economies are generally small and open
and have achieved a high degree of trade and
financial integration with western European
economies, all measures aimed at supporting
western European economies had an indirect pos-
itive impact on CEE countries.
EU membership.Finally, for EU members, the fact
of membership is certainly a stabilising factor. It
has helped to strengthen policy institutions in the
new member states, has enhanced their credibil-
ity, has improved the business climate, and sym-
bolises the irreversible character of integration
between the previously separated parts of Europe.
EU membership can also be regarded as an ‘insur-
ance policy’ as countries can rely, if needed, on
the EU facilities discussed so far. In candidate and
potential candidate countries the prospect of EU
membership and the work done to fulfil member-
ship conditions also helped to strengthen institu-
tions and to improve the business climate before
the crisis, leading to, among others, capital flows
in the form of FDI. Better institutions and large
stocks of FDI (especially in the banking industry
as argued before) likely cushioned the impact of
the crisis.
3. AMPLIFYING FACTORS
Certain actions, or failures to act, on the part of EU
institutions and governments, have amplified the
effects of the crisis on CEE countries.
Uncoordinated sequence of deposit guarantee
MFA loans:
Amount and date of
Commission’s pro-
posal to the Council
MFA grants: Amount
and date of Commis-
sion’s proposal to the
Council
IMF Stand-by Agree-
ment (loans): amount
and date of Staff
Level Agreement
Total loans from IMF
and EU (% of 2008
GDP)
EU loans (% of IMF
loans)
Armenia
€65 million
16 October 2009
€35 million
16 October 2009
€ 414 million, 3 March
2009; increased to
€587 million on 22
June 2009
8.0% 11.1%
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
€100 million
30 October 2009
€1.12 billion
5 May 2009
9.6% 9.0%
Georgia
€46 million*
16 October 2009 ----
Serbia
€200 million
8 October 2009
€407 million, 17
November 2008;
increased to €2.94 bn
on 15 May 2009
9.2% 6.8%
Ukraine
€500 million
29 October 2009
€12.33 billion
26 October 2008
10.5% 4.1%
Table 3: EU’s macro-financial assistance (MFA) and earlier IMF Stand-by Agreements for the
countries concerned
Sources: Commission press releases IP/09/1535, IP/09/1475, IP/09/1654, IP/09/1659. IMF press release 08/259, 08/289,
09/52, 09/151, 09/169, 09/228. Note. IMF loans were converted into euros using the exchange rate of the month of staff
level agreement. * The MFA grant of €46 million to Georgia is part of a comprehensive EU package up to €500 million to sup-
port Georgia’s economic recovery, pledged at the October 2008 Donor Conference in the aftermath of the August 2008 con-
flict with Russia.EU SUPPORT TO CEE COUNTRIES DURING THE CRISISZsolt Darvas
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upgrades. Starting in September 2008 euro-area
governments substantially increased their
deposit guarantees (some are unlimited), but at
first in a uncoordinated fashion. Subsequently,
joint decisions were made and new member state
governments also introduced such measures8.
But the uncoordinated sequence of deposit guar-
antee upgrades may have compounded the low-
ering of the credibility of CEE governments and the
capital flight to ‘quality’ that has characterised the
crisis (see Darvas and Pisani-Ferry, 2009).
Asymmetric liquidity and credit management.
While western European parent banks did provide
continued access to liquidity for subsidiaries, and
we have argued that their presence had a stabil-
ising role in the CEE region, anecdotal evidence
also suggests that in periods of heightened stress
some of them have prioritised hoarding of liquidity
at home. Banks may also curtail credit asymmet-
rically in the future. This could either be a rational
response to deteriorating economic conditions in
the CEE countries, or a result of the banks’ objec-
tive to decrease their exposure to CEE due to the
necessary deleveraging.
Restricted access to euro liquidity.The near-paral-
ysis of the euro-area interbank money market
implied that (especially non-foreign-bank owned)
commercial banks in the CEE countries were
largely cut off from euro liquidity. The more the
ECB was (rightly) moving into new territory to
remedy the shortage of liquidity in the euro area,
the more it was inadvertently putting CEE banks
– at least those without access to a parent bank’s
liquidity – at a disadvantage. Domestic central
banks could have provided euro liquidity by draw-
ing on their foreign currency reserves, but in times
of crisis, this is not deemed sensible. As shown in
Table 2, the ECB did not provide currency swaps to
any of the new EU member states, though it pro-
vided swaps to Denmark and Sweden. In this
sense, the ECB did not follow the Federal Reserve,
which provided currency swaps to not just all
industrialised countries, but also to Brazil, Korea,
Mexico and Singapore. As well as direct help,
swaps at least to new EU member states would
have improved market sentiment, thereby
decreasing the pressure on the financial markets
in these countries.
Securities eligible for ECB refinancing. The list of
securities eligible for ECB refinancing was
expanded substantially to include lower-quality
securities and non-euro denominated securities9,
in response to the crisis, but was not expanded to
include local-currency denominated bonds issued
by the governments of the non euro-area
countries. While this was a perfectly natural pro-
vision when the European money markets worked
smoothly, the liquidity shortage made it unattrac-
tive for euro-area financial institutions to hold
non-euro government bonds, thus contributing to
their sell-off.
ECB operations with non-euro area commercial
banks. The suggestion that temporary access to
ECB facilities should be given to non-euro area
commercial banks, which could have substituted
the malfunctioning euro-area money market for
these banks, was not implemented. This non-
implementation has disadvantaged CEE banks
that relied heavily on euro-area money markets
before the crisis, especially those banks that did
not have a western European parent bank.
A ‘mega-fund’ for CEE. Some academics, but also
the prime minister of Hungary, advocated the set-
ting up of a fund of several hundred billion euros
for various purposes, such as replacing the short-
fall in private capital flows to the region and sup-
porting local banks. To the extent that such a fund
could have alleviated the undue pain felt by some
CEE countries, the lack of its establishment dis-
advantaged these countries.
Euro area enlargement. The European Commis-
sion, the ECB and major euro-area member states
did not change their position regarding euro-area
entry. Euro-area entry criteria were set up in the
early 1990s when the euro area did not exist and
the EU had 12 members. The economic founda-
tions of the criteria are fundamentally flawed, as
euro-area members continue to violate the crite-
ria, while the EU's expansion to 27 members has
made the criteria tougher for new member states
8. Ireland was the first euro-
area country to offer
unlimited bank deposit
guarantee after the
nationalisation of North-
ern Rock by the UK gov-
ernment, which offered
unlimited deposit guar-
antees also in Ireland.
Ireland was first
accused of giving unfair
advantage to its banking
system by other west-
ern European govern-
ments. A few days later,
however, other euro-
area governments
increased substantially
their guarantees (in
some cases, e.g. Ger-
many and Austria, also
to an unlimited
amount). On 7 October
2008, EU finance minis-
ters agreed to raise the
level of deposit guaran-
tees to a minimum of
€50,000 in all EU
member states.
9. On 15 October 2008, the
ECB decided to expand
the list of assets eligible
as collateral in Eurosys-
tem credit operations by
non-euro denominated
instruments, namely in
US dollars, British
pounds and Japanese
yen, provided the secu-
rity was issued in the
euro area. Zsolt Darvas EU SUPPORT TO CEE COUNTRIES DURING THE CRISIS
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to meet. European officials did not initiate the
adaptation of the entry criteria to the new circum-
stances, though the European Council has the abil-
ity to reform the criteria without a formal treaty
change (Darvas, 2009b). This resistance to
change disadvantaged countries that were seek-
ing the stability and credibility offered by euro-
area membership.
4. ASSESSMENT
The crisis has hit central and eastern European
countries harder than other regions of the world.
To express solidarity, but also to recognise the
EU’s responsibility toward a region that is highly
integrated in political and economic terms into the
EU, the EU and EU-related institutions have
mobilised substantial funds (predominantly in the
form of loans) to support crisis-hit countries in the
region. In addition, other indirect channels were
employed by the EU to help CEE countries cope
with the crisis. Yet there were certain actions, or
failures to act, on the part of EU institutions and
governments, that have amplified the effects on
CEE countries of the crisis.
As emphasised by, eg IMF (2009), EBRD (2009)
and Mitra et al (2009), though there have been
dramatic declines in the national outputs of CEE
countries, the ‘worst problems from past crises’,
such as currency overshooting, bank runs and col-
lapses of banking systems, have so far been
avoided. The EU has certainly played an important
role in this, but it is difficult to assess the direct
impact of the various facilities and channels
because there are many factors at play at the
same time. For example, market sentiment
towards CEE countries, and hence capital flows,
depends not just on EU-related policies, but on,
among other factors, the perception of domestic
policy measures adopted in the CEE countries,
actions by international financial institutions and
global market sentiment. Still, there are certain
developments that are worth summarising regard-
ing the role of the EU in supporting crisis-hit CEE
countries.
First, multilateral financial assistance in the form
of coordinated loans had stabilising effects. Both
the announcements of new agreements and the
subsequent confirmation of the disbursement of
additional tranches calmed markets, and have led
to currency appreciations and interest-rate falls. 
Second, the banking system played a crucial role.
The financial sectors were relatively sound (com-
pared with the Asian countries in the 1990s, see
eg EBRD, 2009) before the crisis and western
European banks – which own the majority of
banking systems in CEE countries – have
remained committed to the region. Available infor-
mation suggests that western European parent
banks have mostly rolled over expiring liabilities
of subsidiaries and have also remained commit-
ted to recapitalising subsidiaries if needed.
Domestic credit aggregates are contracting in
many CEE countries, but it is not possible to deter-
mine the roles of supply and demand conditions
in this development. Efforts to coordinate parent
bank behaviour, as well as ECB support for parent
banks, and the EU’s political commitment to the
support of subsidiaries, have certainly played
important roles.
Third, the little direct support given by the ECB to
countries outside the euro area (apart from swap
lines to Denmark and Sweden) is difficult to ratio-
nalise for an outside observer. The suggested
swap, collateral and banking cooperation arrange-
ments – when accompanied by proper risk man-
agement practices – would have not posed a risk
of losses for the ECB beyond the risk inherent in
standard ECB operations, but would have been a
natural (temporary) response to the implications
of the drying-up of liquidity in euro-area money
and swap markets to the CEE financial systems.
Such ECB responses would have alleviated the
stress on CEE money, government bond and cur-
rency markets.
Fourth, the non-establishment of a ‘mega-fund’ to
support CEE economies is controversial. One could
probably design a fund that could well augment
available facilities without creating moral hazard,
but the lack of clarity in the various proposals, the
existing facilities and the standard (non-crisis) EUEU SUPPORT TO CEE COUNTRIES DURING THE CRISISZsolt Darvas
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supports to new member states and other neigh-
bourhood and developing countries, made EU and
western European policymakers understandably
reluctant.
Fifth, a comparison of countries inside and out-
side the euro area suggests that euro-area mem-
bership is a great shielding factor in times of crisis.
In the current crisis, some euro-area members
with worse fundamentals fared much better then
some CEE countries outside the euro area with
better fundamentals (see, eg the brief comparison
between Greece and Hungary in Box 1). The reluc-
tance to reform the euro-area entry criteria,
despite their well-known deficiencies and the
questionable precedents of some of their previous
applications (Darvas, 2009b), have not made
crisis management easier in the new EU member
states.
Finally, the EU has mobilised substantial funds to
support new EU member states directly, but crisis
support for the neighbourhood countries was
largely left indirectly for the international financial
institutions and western European banks with
subsidiaries in those countries. As Darvas
(2009a) argued, the respectable European boost
to the resources of the IMF does not do away with
the need for substantial direct EU involvement in
crisis support beyond its borders. Direct support
from the EU would also have a strong signalling
effect, and the EU’s stand during the crisis could
have had far-reaching consequences for the rela-
tionship between the EU and its partner countries.
The Commission's October 2009 proposals to
extend loans to neighbourhood countries were
undoubtedly important and helpful, but somewhat
late, and one may also argue that the proposed
volume of lending is relatively small.
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BOX 1: THE EURO SHELTER: HUNGARY VERSUS GREECE
The cases of Hungary and Greece strongly underline that euro-area membership makes a difference when
it comes to crisis response. Both countries are EU members but only Greece is in the euro area. Both
countries had fiscal problems before the crisis in the form of large budget deficits and high or rising gov-
ernment debt, but Greece has fared much better than Hungary in the crisis despite worse fundamentals.
For example, Greece had much higher government debt (Figure 2), a more-or-less similar budget deficit
(Figure 3) and a much higher current-account deficit (Figure 4) than Hungary before the crisis (all
expressed as a percentage of GDP). Despite the differences in these fundamental vulnerability indicators,
Hungary experienced serious speculative attacks on its currency and government bond markets, and had
to rely on a multilateral financial-assistance programme, while tensions in Greece were milder. Hungary’s
current-account deficit is expected to shrink from 6.5 percent of GDP in 2007 to below two percent of GDP
in 2009-2011, while Greece is still expected to have a current account deficit around eight percent of GDP
in the coming years, according to DG ECFIN's October 2009 forecasts. The government debt-to-GDP ratio
is expected to expand in Greece to 135 percent by 2011, in contrast to Hungary, where it is expected to
stabilise somewhat below 80 percent. While the spread over German 10-year government bond has
increased to some extent in Greece in response to the crisis, in Hungary, where the spread was already
high before the crisis, the hike induced by the crisis was much larger than in Greece (Figure 5). Even in
December 2009 when concerns about the sustainability of Greek public finances intensified and the
chance of eventual IMF intervention in Greece – notwithstanding the emphatic denials – has increased,
the resulting interest-rate increase was small compared to interest-rate rises in Hungary during the crisis.
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Figure 2: General government
gross debt (% GDP), 1990-2011
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Figure 3: General government
balance (% GDP), 1990-2011
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Figure 4: Current account
balance (% GDP), 1990-2011
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Figure 5: 10-year government bond yields (%),
Jan 1995-Dec 2009
Sources: Eurostat, ECB, IMF, Datastream and October 2009 forecast of DG ECFIN. Note. Government bond yields for
December 2009 were calculated as the averages of daily data between 1 and 21 December 2009.